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A New Test for Mens Rea? Safeguarding Legal Certainty in a 
European Area ofFreedom, Security andJustice 
Sabine Gless * 
Abstract 
Legal Certainty is considered a prerequisite for a fair criminal justice system in all European 
legal orders. The principle of mutual recognition puts this principle at a risk, for instance, by 
abolishing the dual criminality requirement. The paper analyses different remedies for this 
problem, and argues for a solution in substantive law: A new test for mens rea, which rests on 
the establishment of a reasonable duty to learn and be aware of foreign laws. Thus, the risk of 
ignorance of foreign laws no longer rests with the individual alone. 
I. Introduction 
In the process of establishing a European area of freedom, security and justice, the 
principle of loyalty - as laid down in Art. 10 EC-Treaty - plays a significant role. 
This principle has an important function serving as a hinge which o bliges the 
Member States to aim at "good faith coilaboration" and thus acts as a vehicle for the 
European objective of establishing an area of freedom, security and justice within 
the Member States' national criminal justice system. In doing so, however, it also 
causes conflicts with traditional principles of criminal law and raises new questions. 
One of those questions concerns the meaning and implications of legal certainty in 
an ever-closer space of cross-border law enforcement, especiaily after the Member 
States have restricted the principle of dual criminality when implementing instru-
ments of mutual recognition. 
What relevance does the principle oflegal certainty have in today's European area 
of freedom, security and justice based on the principle of mutual recognition? 
This paper will argue that: 
1. the principle of legal certainty is a basic principle in both the national and the 
European criminaljustice system, 
2. which is put at risk by instruments of mutual recognition, such as the European 
Arrest Warrant (EAW), 
3. thus, a remedy must be introduced to prevent an infringement of the principle 
oflegal certainty. 
There are numerous examples to illustrate the conflict between eff ective cross-
border law enforcement and the principle of legal certainty, especiaily in the area of 
aileged economic crime on a small scale as weil as on a large scale. 
To simplify matters, I will use the case of a merchant seiling a specific product. 
However, comparable cases could just as weil involve stock-brokers who trade across 
borders, lawyers carrying out sensitive business transactions for their clients etc. - all 
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done in good faith and wfrh a common wish to respect the law of the respective 
home country, but at the same time working in an area which bears the risk of 
criminal prosecution. 
Our example involves a merchant selling hair restorer, i. e. small bottles contain-
ing blue liquid promising to stop loss of hair if applied to the scalp three times a day 
- 20 EUR per bottle. The merchant himself believes in the merits of his product 
when used on a long-term basis. In reality, the blue liquid does no harm, but there 
is no proof that it ever helped in any given case either. 1 Being weil aware of that 
permanent risk of criminal prosecution, the merchant has even studied the criminal 
code of his country, and he is ready to reimburse the money should any of his 
customers complain. 
According to the jurisprudence of his country, no fraud is conunitted should 
victims be too trustful and/ or as long as financial damage is ruled out. 
Should the merchant nevertheless fear criminal prosecution for alleged fraud, if 
he seils his product to individuals, and does the prosecution differ depending on 
whether the customers are locals or tourists? 
II. The principle of legal certa_inty 
In essence, the principle of legal certainty requires that subj ects of the law must 
be able to clearly ascertain their rights and obligations on the basis of the body of 
law. 2 Thus, legal rules must be laid down in a clear and precis~ statute in order to 
enable the citizens to foresee legal consequences of an action. The· principle of legal 
certainty forms part of all national legal systems as weil as the EU body of law. 3 lt 
has special relevance for criminal law. 
1. The principle of legal certainty in national jurisdictions -. e. g. Ger-
many 
The special importance of legal certainty in national criminal justice systems is 
illustrated in German law, in which the implicatiofls of legal certainty for criminal 
law have been settled and accepted long ago (although the consequences for certain 
legal instruments, for example, the limitation of time for criminal prosecution, are 
still discussed): The principle of legal certainty ensures that everybody is able to 
anticipate (before acting) which behaviour is forbidden and will be punished: an act 
can only be punished if the illegal quality of this very act has been legaily 
determined before its commitment. The nuilum crimen, nuila poena sine lege-
principle encompasses different fundamental guarantees: the prohibition of the 
retroactive effect of criminal laws, the prohibition of customary law, the prohibition 
of analogy, and the principle of certainty. 
1 See ECJ C-220/98 Judgment of 13. 1. 2000 Lancester deciding a case of allegedly misleading sales promotion. 
2 European Criminal Policy Initiative, Manifesto no. 4.1 (http:/ /sites.google.com/site/ eucrimpol/manifest). 
3 See e. g. D. Wyatt & A. Dashwood's, European Union Law, 5th ed. 2006, no. 7-010. 
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Thus, the principle of certainty serves different purposes: it obligates the legislator 
to define the elements of an off ence and to set the sanction in a parliamentary 
statute, and (as a consequence) it guarantees the individual that only those acts 
which fall under such a criminal statute may be punishable. 4 The citizen shall have 
the option to adapt his or her behaviour to the criminal laws in power and thus 
avoid punishment. Such a potential effect on the individuals' behaviour is also the 
(pre-)condition for criminal law to achieve the objective of deterrence. 
Thus, the merchant selling useless hair restorer for good money (but in good faith 
and with the intention to reimburse displeased customers) shall only face criminal 
prosecution as laid down in the German criminal code, if his act carries all the 
features of fraud at the time of selling. Even if his conduct is improper, he is shielded 
from criminal prosecution and may continue in his business as a salesman as long as 
it is not incriminated by the law. 
2. The principle oflegal certainty in European case law 
Long before the European area of freedom, security and justice was introduced, 
the case law ofboth European institutions important for the national criminal justice 
systems, the European Court for Human Rights in Strasbourg and the European 
Court of Justice in Luxembourg, had also put emphasis on the implication of the 
principle oflegal certainty for law enforcement. 
a) Case law of the European Court ofHuman Rights (ECtHR) 
The relevant case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
emphasizes the close relationship between the principle oflegal certainty guaranteed 
by Article 7 and the "quality of law" requirement concluding that an interference 
with an individual's fundamental rights must be governed by clear legal principles: 
"When speaking of "law" Article 7 alludes to the very same concept as that to 
which the Convention refers elsewhere when using the term, a concept which 
comprises written as weil as unwritten law and implies qualitative requirements, 
notably those of accessibility and foreseeability."5 
The case law stresses the importance of these two closely connected principles in 
various judgements6 focusing on the key issue: the individual's ability to foresee 
whether (a certain) conduct will contravene the criminal law.7 This was clearly 
spelled out long ago, for instance in the Sunday Times case in 1979:8 
"First, the law must be adequately accessible: the citizen must be able to have an 
indication that is adequate in the circumstances of the legal rules applicable to a 
given case. Secondly, a norm cannot be regarded as a 'law' unless it is formulated 
4 See Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts (BVerfGE) 75, 329, at 340-341. 
5 SW v. UK (1995) A.335-C, at 32; see also: A.Ashworth, Human Rights, Criminal Law, and the Principles of Legal 
Certainty and Non-Retrospectivity, in: Arnold u. a., Festschrift für Eser, München, 2005, p. 50. 
6 See Steel and others v. UK App. No. 24838/94 with further references. 
7 Silverv. UK (1983) A.61. 
8 Sunday Timesv. UK (No.1) (1979) A.30, at [49]. 
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with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct: he must be 
able - if need be with appropriate advice - to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable 
in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail." 
The crucial factor in order to judge whether the principle of certainty is abided 
by is the criterion of foreseeability. 
b) Case law of the European Court ofJustice (ECJ)9 
The case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) adopted the principle of 
legal certainty as a basic principle: 
"lt has consistently been held that the principle of legal certainty [ ... ] . requires 
that rules imposing obligations on persons must be clear and precise so that they 
may know without ambiguity what are their rights and obligations and take steps 
d. '·l „10 accor mg y ... 
The principle of legal certainty does not only shield the individual from a direct 
application ofEU law,11 but also ensures foreseeability in the implementation ofEU 
law: according to the case law of the European Court of Justice, individuals must be 
able to ascertain their rights and obligations with regard to the body of law relevant 
to their actions and accordingly, in a case of criminal prosecution with regard to the 
criminal statutes. The ECJ follows the ECtHR case law, which emphasizes the 
criterion of foreseeability. 12 This feature has to be integrated into the concept of a 
European area of freedom, security and justice. 
III. The p'rinciple of legal certainty and the European area of freedom, 
security and justice 
Today's European area of freedom, security and justice relies on mutual recogni-
tion: a judicial decision legally rendered in one EU-Member State is a valid decision 
in all other Member States. Instruments based on the principle of mutual recogni-
tion allow for cross..;.border enforcement of a judicial decision issued in one Member 
State. Roughly speaking, such a decision - for instance a European Arrest Warrant 
- will be executed in all Member States without further restrictions. 
1. The principle of legal certainty and mutual recognition 
The concept of mutual recognition has modified various features of cross-border 
cooperation; first of all (and especially) it has triggered an ambition to abolish dual 
9 For further information, see:J Raitio, The Principle ofLegal Certainty in EC Law 2003. 
10 ECJ C-439/01 Judgment of 16. 1. 2003 Cipra and Kvasnicka, para. 47; ECJ C-169/80 Judgment of 9. 7. 1981 
Gondrand Freres and Garancini, para. 17; ECJ 257 /86 Judgment of 21. 6. 1988 Commission v. Italy, para. 12; ECJ 325/ 
85 Judgment of 15. 12. 1987 Ireland v. Commission, para. 18. · 
11 A.Klip, European Crirninal Law (ECL) 2009, p. 170. 
12 See also ECJ C-76/06 Judgment of 7. 6. 2007 P, Britannia Alloys & Chemicals Ltd v. Commission [2007] ECR I-
4405, in which the Court adhered to the requirement of foreseeability. Advocate General Bot in his Opinion of 1 
March 2007 in this case explicitly discussed the requirements of Article 7 ECHR. 
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criminality. Whereas traditional cooperation requires that the act for which mutual 
legal assistance is sought after constitutes a crime punishable in both countries, by 
the requesting as weil as by the requested parties, the new instruments of mutual 
recognition foilow a different approach: they all work with a list of - rather vaguely 
formulated - categories of offences for which dual criminality does not apply 
anymore. Consequently the law of the requesting state always determines incrimi-
nation. 
a) Assessment in the case law of the ECJ 
Does mutual recogp.ition breach the principle of legality - or rather legal 
certainty - in criminal matters? 
This question was raised in the case of Advocaten voor der Wereld: 13 is it true 
that a person deprived of his or her liberty on the basis of an EAW loses protection 
from the principle of legal certainty? Under the EAW regime, a person who wants 
to benefit from the guarantee that criminal legislation must satisfy conditions as to 
precision, clarity and predictability must know the laws of the 27 (Member) States 
cooperating in the EAW framework, otherwise it is impossible to determine 
whether an act performed at a particular time does or does not constitute an 
·offence. 
The example of cross-border merchandise illustrates this very weil: 
A merchant selling useless hair restorer for good money (albeit in good faith and 
despite the readiness on his part to reimburse displeased customers) could face 
criminal prosecution in other European jurisdictions according to which his sales 
qualify as fraud. He is not shielded from criminal prosecution, because the principle 
of dual criminality no longer protects him. 
N evertheless, the ECJ deciding Advocaten voor der Wereld denied that mutual 
recognition in the EAW-framework infringes the principle of legal certainty. lt 
declared that 
"[it] is common ground that [ the basic principles of Art. 6 TEU] include the 
principle of the legality of criminal offences and penalties" .14 
Subsequently the court explained the principle oflegality 
"implies that legislation must define clearly offences and the penalties which they 
attrac.t. That condition is met in the case where the individual concerned is in a 
position, on the basis of the wording of the relevant provision and with the help of 
the interpretative assistance given by the courts, to know which acts or omissions 
will make him criminally liable". 15 
Legal scholars assessed the court's ruling to be "sound", because "the abolition of 
double criminality does not aff ect the legality. Alleged criminal liability will be based 
13 See Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer of 12. 9. 2006 in Case 303/05 Advocaten voor der vVereld, 
para. 14. 
14 ECJ C-303/05 Judgment of 3. 5. 2007 Advocaten voor der vvereld, para. 46. 
15 ECJ C-303/05 Judgment of 3.5.2007 Advocaten voor der vVereld, para. 50, with reference to ECtHRjudgment 
of22June in Coeme and Others v. Belgium, Reports 2000-VII, §145. 
EuCLR A New Test for Mens Rea 119 
upon the applicable law of the Member State issuing the European Arrest War-
t" 16 ran . 
Such reasoning, however, is very formalistic and unworldly, and it does not fully 
consider the impact of the principle of legal certainty.17 The key question is not 
whether in the national justice systems criminal statutes are formulated precisely or 
if law enforcement agents adhere to basic principles, but whether a person "may 
know without ambiguity what are [her or his] rights and obligations and take steps 
accordingly" .18 
The reasoning in Advocaten voor der Wereld is surprising, because the ECJ 
demonstrated greater prudence in other cases. For instance, it held that "if a legal 
act is not available in the language version of the Member State, it cannot be held 
against an individual until the date in which the issue of the Official Journal is 
actually available" .19 
According to this doctrine, a person may only be subject to the EAW framework 
if she or he knows the relevant criminal statutes of all cooperating states, as 
otherwise he or she cannot avert prosecution or rather the issuing of an EAW20 
However, being knowledgeable of 27 (+2) criminal justice systems is a rather 
unreasonable and unaccomplishable demand. 
b) Assessment in the case law of the German Constitutional Court 
The risk of infringing on legal certainty has also been a constant threat concern-
ing the rulings of the German Constitutional Court on cases involving the specific 
instrument of mutual recognition, which is heavily applied in practice, namely the 
European Arrest Warrant (EAW). 
Recently, in a judgment of 3 September 2009, for instance, the Court has 
impeded the extradition of a German Greek national to Greece (for charges of 
money laundering and corruption)21 with the following statement being the first of 
its kind, after the judgment declaring the German European Arrest Warrant Act 
unconstitutional and void:22 
"Legal certainty is a basic requirement for freedom, i. e. for the self-determination 
of a citizen to realize his or her vision of one 's own life." ("Die Verlässlichkeit der 
Rechtsordnung ist wesentliche Voraussetzung für Freiheit, das heißt für die Selbst-
bestimmung über den eigenen Lebensentwurf und seine Umsetzung. ")23 
16 Klip, ECL 2009, p. 173. 
17 See also V. Mitselegas, ELJR (2007) 303; E. Herlin-Karnell, 14 Maastricht]. Eur. & Comp.L. 15 2007. 
18 ECJ C-439/01 Judgment of 16. 1. 2003 Cipra and Kvasnicka, para. 47; ECJ C-169/80 Judgment of 9. 7. 1981 
Gondrand Freres and Garancini, para. 17; ECJ 257 /86 Judgment of 21. 6. 1988 Commission v. Italy, para. 12; ECJ 325/ 
85 Judgment of15. 12. 1987 Ireland v. Commission, para. 18. 
19 ECJ C-98/78Judgment of25. 1. 1979 A. Racke v. Hauptzollamt Mainz. ECJ C-88/76Judgment of31. 3. 1977 
Societe pour l'exportation des sucres SA v. Commission, it was published and distributed later because of a strike. 
20 See also: E. Guild, European Law Journal 10 2004, 218, and Special issue on EU Criminal Law in 12 Maastricht 
J. Bur. & Comp.L. 115 2005; E. Herlin-Karnell, German Law Journal 8, 1147, 1152. 
21 BVerfGE ofSept. 3rd, 2009 (2 BvR 1826/09). 
22 BVerfGE of July 18th, 2005 (2 BvR 2236/04), para. 85 (published in BVerfGE 113, 273). 
23 BVerfGE ofSept. 3rd, 2009 (2 BvR 1826/09), para. 18. 
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In the earlier judgment, the Court basically vested a citizen with the right to trust 
in the validity of the national law, at least as long as the action had taken place in his 
or her home country, claiming that otherwise he or she would be made subj ect to a 
law, would have to face prosecution based on criminal statutes, which were basically 
unknown and unfamiliar to him or her, thus making it difficult or even impossible 
for the citizen to ascertain relevant rights and obligations (,, ... bindet ihn auch im 
Ergebnis an ein materielles Strafrecht, das er demokratisch mitzugestalten nicht in 
der Lage war, das er - anders als das deutsche Strafrecht - nicht kennen muss und 
das ihm in vielen Fällen wegen mangelnder Vertrautheit der jeweiligen nationalen 
öffentlichen Kontexte auch keine hinreichend sichere Parallelwertung in der Laien-
h„ 1 b ") 24 sp are er au t. . 
The German Constitutional Court has emphasized its doubts towards European 
criminal law, or rather criminal law determined by European specifications in its 
judgment on the Lisbon Treaty. In this decision it holds: Criminal punishment must 
be based on guilt, which "presupposes human beings who themselves determine 
their actions and can decide in favour of right or wrong ... ". 25 Clearly such a 
decision is impossible without a knowledge of the relevant law.26 
2. Possible solutions? 
Is there a remedy for the infringement on the principle of legal certainty, which 
is functionally linked to the culpability principle, - either on the procedural level or 
by establishing a new substantive requirement for cross-border prosecution?27 
a) Territoriality proviso 
Could a territoriality proviso provide sufficient protection for the individual? 
The Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant (as weil as those 
frameworks and decisions establishing other instruments of mutual recognition) 
consider such provisos: judicial authorities of an EU-Member State may refuse 
extradition when the warrant relates to off ences which "are regarded by the law of 
the executing Member State as having been committed in whole or in part in the 
territory of the executing Member State". This territoriality-based prevailing jur-
isdiction played an important role during the implementation of the instruments of 
mutual recognition in the EU Member States - aiming at preserving sovereignty in 
criminal law enforcement in certain cases, but also (at the same time) taking into 
account the principle of legal certainty. 
24 BVerfGE ofJuly 18th, 2005 (2 BvR 2236/04), para. 85 (published in BVerfGE 113, 273). 
25 BverfGE ofJune 30th, 2009, - 2 BvE 2/08 - 2 BvE 5/08 - 2 BvR 1010/08 - 2 BvR 1022/08 - 2 BvR 1259/ 
08 - 2 BvR 182/09, para 364 (published in BVerfGE 123, 267). 
26 Ch. Safferling, A Criminal Law for Europe: Between National Heritage and Transnational Necessities, 10 
German Law Journal 2009, p. 1386. 
27 For further approaches to solutions see P. Asp/D. Frände/A. von Hirsch, Double Criminality and Transnational 
Measures in EU Criminal Proceedings, Zeitschrift für Internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik 2006, 512 as weil as 
European Criminal Policy Initiative, Manifesto no. 4 (http://sites.google.com/site/ eucrimpol/manifest). 
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Both arguments emerge from the German Constitutional Court's ruling on the 
EAW The Court explained that in cases in which a significant domestic connecting 
factor is established, the "trust of German citizens in their own legal order shall be 
protected".28 The judges in Karlsruhe, therefore, obliged the German lawmaker to 
put special emphasis on this consideration when ·drafting a new law implementing 
the European Arrest Warrant. German legal scholars criticized the Constitutional 
Court for overemphasizing the legal interdependency between the German state 
and its citizens.29 However, while reading the judgment and keeping the threat to 
the principle of legal certainty in mind, a different opinion, which is justified by the 
Court's explanation on how to handle alleged perpetrators being accused of crimes 
committed abroad, prevails: 
„People, who take actions in another jurisdiction, must know that they will be 
judged according to the law of that jurisdiction."3° Consequently, even if the 
perpetrator of a crime succeeded in escaping to his or her home country, the judges 
did not consider his or her nationality to impede extradition. 
Territoriality provisos, however, have certain drawbacks. First of all, the national 
jurisdictions provide differing concepts with regard to .. ~n act having been com-
mitted in whole or in part in the territory of its state. 
Secondly, territorial exemptions could lead to the establishment of a national safe 
haven. If - for instance - a country is lenient when it comes to fraudsters, they 
would operate from that country being protected in the middle of the (appointed) 
area of freedom, security and justice. 
b) New test f or mens rea? 
If one rejects the procedural remedy of a territorial clause, substantive law could 
provide a solution instead. Criminal liability requires "a guilty mind": "Actus non 
facit reum nisi mens sit rea" (an act does not make [a person] guilty unless the mind 
be guilty). This basic principle applies world-wide. 
A person who is ignorant about his or her legal obligations, which we assumed is 
the case after the abolishment of dual criminality, cannot have a "guilty mind". 
However, ignorance oflaw is no excuse, except in very rare cases. 
A merchant who sells useless hair restorer, but takes precautions to go unpunished 
under the law of his home country, does not break the law of that country - he 
may, however, still commit a crime in other countries. 
This problem is not unknown in European law, which often deals with cross-
border activity. Again, the case law of the ECJ shows that - depending on their 
professional activity - individuals may have to proceed with a high degree of 
caution.31 Consistent with the reasoning in Advocaten v9or der Wereld, the 
28 BVerfGE ofJuly 18th, 2005 (2 BvR 2236/04), para. 86-87 (published in BVe1fGE 113, 273). 
29 See e. g. U. Hufeld,Juristische Schulung 2005, 865, 866. 
30 BVerfGE ofJuly 18th, 2005 (2 BvR 2236/04), para. 86 (published in BVerfGE 113, 273). 
31 ECJ C-189/02 P Judgment of 28. 6. 2005 Dansk Rßrindustri v. Commission. Joined Cases: ECJ C-202/02 P 
Judgment of 28. 6. 2005 Isoplus Fernwärmetechnik VertriebsgesellscheftmbH v. Commission, ECJ C-205/02 P to ECJ C-
208/02 P and ECJ C-213/02 P Judgment of 28. 6. 2005 KB KELIT Kunststoffwerke GmbH v. Commission, para. 219. 
122 EuCLR 
Luxembourg Court has held before that the principle of legality is satisfied "where 
the individual can know from the wording of the relevant provision and, if need be, 
with the assistance of the courts' interpretation of it, what acts and omissions will 
k h . . . 11 li bl " 32 mae 1mcnmmay a e. 
The emphasis of the Luxembourg Court is rather on the element of lex certa 
than on the element of ( de facto) foreseeability. In criminal proceedings against X, 
the Court considered: 
"the principle that a provision of the criminal law may not be interpreted 
extensively to the detriment of the def endant, which is the corollary of the principle 
of legality in relation to crime and punishment and more generally of the principle 
of legal certainty precludes bringing criminal proceedings in respect of conduct not 
clearly defined as culpable in law."33 
This approach to legal certainty off ers only restricted leeway to consider the 
importance of individual knowledge. 
rv. Conclusion 
lt is true that ignorance of the law can be - in principle - no excuse in criminal 
law. 
This finding, however, may be one of the key factors in order to solve the 
problem of a constricted principle oflegal certainty in a framework merging various 
national criminal justice systems: an explanation as to why - or rather when -
ignorance cannot be an excuse is the following: "The [ ... ] rule that ignorance is not 
a valid excuse, must be valid in most cases, because [ ... ] to admit the excuse [ ... ] 
would be to encourage ignorance".34 Whereas a person who takes reasonable steps 
to learn the law, but is de facto unable to eliminate the risk of error should be 
d 35 excuse . 
The establishment of a reasonable duty to learn and know the law, potentially 
leading to punishment in case this obligation should be violated, might provide a 
possibility to create a more complex system of allocating the risk that ignorance of 
foreign laws brings about, thus balancing the interests of the individual by means of 
a protection based on the principle of certainty of law against the objective of 
effective cross-border law enforcement in a European area of freedom, security and 
justice based on the principle of mutual recognition. 
32 ECJ C-308/06 Judgment of 3. 6. 2008 The Queen on the application ef: International Association of Independent 
Tanker Owners (Intertanko), International Association of Dry Cargo Ship owners (Intercargo), Creek Shipping Co-operation 
Committee, Lloyd's Register, International Salvage Union v. Secretary of Statefor Transport, not yet reported, para. 71. 
33 Joined Cases ECJ C-74/95 and ECJ C-129/95 Judgment of 12. 12. 1996 Criminal proceedings against X, para. 25. 
34 0. Wendell Holmes, The Common Law 4.8, 1881, at 48. 
35 See D. Kahan, 96 Michigan Law Review 127, 1997, at 134. 
